In this blog, we've been talking about investing and getting a return on your investment. However, as most readers tell me, besides being investors, they are also salaried workers. Do the same principles of investment apply to salaried workers? But of course.
One should look objectively at compensation, with an investor's eye to it. The concept of return on salary should be routinely checked to make sure one is not working in vain.
Return on salary is simply the annualized rate of change in total compensation. For example, if one gets a pay raise on year 2 of 10% and then again on year 3, and no more raises until year 5, then over five years, this person has had a return on salary of about 3.8% (assuming salary of X at year 1, this person ends up with a salary of 1.21X on year 5 because a 10% raise applied twice is 1.1 x 1.1 = 1.21 and that annualized over five years is equivalent to 1.21^(1/5) = 3.8%).
So, this fellow would be in practice a little ahead of inflation, assuming inflation is 3% per year -- but not much more than that.
On the other hand, someone who gets a 20% raise twice would fare much better than inflation at the end of the same five-year period: 7.5% per year.
Of course, we are not advocating that people focus on a salaried job to get rich. Very few people manage to do that. But if that's your biggest source of income, then watching your return on salary every so often is important to make sure you're not losing to inflation or effectively staying behind on pay given your added responsibilities as you progress in the job.
If you're only getting raises that match inflation or you're only getting promoted every so many years, you may effectively be making no progress on the financial aspect of the job.
2010-05-07
2010-04-30
How bad is "excessive" debt?
Investing and accounting books everywhere say that too much debt is bad. One can resonate with this mantra. After all, debt holders are the real owners. They are the ones who dictate the terms of the loan and how the loan will be paid back. Many loans even have special clauses that force payback if certain ratios exceed given thresholds -- that is, exactly when the situation is bad for the company. In other words, debt holders are those who lend you an umbrella when it's shining but demand it back the moment the rain shows up on the horizon.
There is no hard and fast rule about how much debt is bad. Certainly, a debt-to-equity ratio of 100 to 1 is pretty bad, no matter how one tries to spin it. But then there are those who think that 2:1 is already pretty bad. These are the likes of Warren Buffett and similar conservative investors. "The least the best" they say. I don't recriminate them. After all, I too don't appreciate gratuitous debt or companies that must take on debt because they have heavy fixed expenses or need too much reinvestment into fixed assets just to stay afloat (case in point: airlines, car manufacturing and some mining companies).
But there's a subtle kind of debt that is not at all bad. That is private debt with the owners.
A common way to fund a startup is by giving it equity -- owners put in cash in exchange for shares. Another common way to do it is to lend money to the company. In many ways, an owner lending money to his or her company is a smart way to fund it and yet keep first dibs on any cash left over in case the company goes under.
I currently hold a tiny cap company that has a 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio and is about to take on more debt. And yet, I'm not at all worried about it because the only reason this debt load is high is because of accounting reasons -- the owners prefer to fund the company that way, but are otherwise convicted of its success and so am I.
So, there you have it. There's bad debt and there's just accounting debt. Differentiating them can provide investing opportunities that are typically overlooked by even the deepest of the value investors.
There is no hard and fast rule about how much debt is bad. Certainly, a debt-to-equity ratio of 100 to 1 is pretty bad, no matter how one tries to spin it. But then there are those who think that 2:1 is already pretty bad. These are the likes of Warren Buffett and similar conservative investors. "The least the best" they say. I don't recriminate them. After all, I too don't appreciate gratuitous debt or companies that must take on debt because they have heavy fixed expenses or need too much reinvestment into fixed assets just to stay afloat (case in point: airlines, car manufacturing and some mining companies).
But there's a subtle kind of debt that is not at all bad. That is private debt with the owners.
A common way to fund a startup is by giving it equity -- owners put in cash in exchange for shares. Another common way to do it is to lend money to the company. In many ways, an owner lending money to his or her company is a smart way to fund it and yet keep first dibs on any cash left over in case the company goes under.
I currently hold a tiny cap company that has a 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio and is about to take on more debt. And yet, I'm not at all worried about it because the only reason this debt load is high is because of accounting reasons -- the owners prefer to fund the company that way, but are otherwise convicted of its success and so am I.
So, there you have it. There's bad debt and there's just accounting debt. Differentiating them can provide investing opportunities that are typically overlooked by even the deepest of the value investors.
Labels:
debt,
debt ratio
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2010-03-19
Final Update on Real Estate Investment
This is my last update on my much discussed foreign real estate investment. The final return on this investment is now about 33%.
We started with an expected return range from 40 to 98% in mind. We assumed something in the middle of the range was doable. There were unforeseen costs and a surge in supply in the area, which made the sale difficult and thus brought the price down. In the end, 33% over about a year is still a very strong return (construction started this time last year, but the land had been purchased six months prior -- the land, though, was cheaper than the construction itself).
The lesson here is to have a margin of safety, as we did, and to watch out for hidden costs, which eat into the profit margins.
All told, this was a successful investment in two fronts: a successful learning opportunity for three first-time real estate developers and a nice return to go along and set the bar high from here on.
Now I'm preparing for the next one. Or two or three.
We started with an expected return range from 40 to 98% in mind. We assumed something in the middle of the range was doable. There were unforeseen costs and a surge in supply in the area, which made the sale difficult and thus brought the price down. In the end, 33% over about a year is still a very strong return (construction started this time last year, but the land had been purchased six months prior -- the land, though, was cheaper than the construction itself).
The lesson here is to have a margin of safety, as we did, and to watch out for hidden costs, which eat into the profit margins.
All told, this was a successful investment in two fronts: a successful learning opportunity for three first-time real estate developers and a nice return to go along and set the bar high from here on.
Now I'm preparing for the next one. Or two or three.
Labels:
brazil,
real estate
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